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In the wake of the 2008 Russo-Georgian
War, Hillary Clinton travelled to Russia
to rebuild relations between Washington
and Moscow. Clinton presented the Rus-
sian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, with
a “reset” button, a symbolic measure to
mark a new era in bilateral ties. Ironi-
cally, due to a translation error, the button
read “overload” rather than “reset”. (Shus-
ter, 2010) In hindsight, “overload” seems
more appropriate in describing the current
tension between the two nations. Exactly
five years after the summit and despite
threats of sanctions, Vladimir Putin signed
a bill absorbing the Crimean Peninsula
into the Russian Federation. Soon after,
Eastern Ukrainian rebels, potentially sup-
ported by Russia, declared independence
from Kiev. In the months that followed,
the West implemented increasingly tough
sanctions and Moscow’s international repu-
tation plummeted. Mikhail Gorbachev has
warned that Europe is at the brink of a
“new Cold War.” (Today, 2015) Yet de-
spite these high costs Putin’s administra-
tion has refused to abandon its interests in
the Crimea.
Many theories have surfaced regard-
ing why the Kremlin is willing to accept
the high economic and political costs of
its actions (including capital flight, reces-
sion, and suspension from the G8). One
such theory is that of diversionary conflict,
as summarized by Ariel Cohen: “Russian
leaders use foreign policy as a tool to but-
tress domestic support and to foster a per-
ception that Russia is surrounded by ene-
mies at a time when its democratic legiti-
macy is deteriorating.” (Aiken, 2014) Pro-
ponents of this perspective argue that the
Kremlin, afraid of its relative weakness due
to fragile domestic conditions, intervened
in Ukraine to stoke nationalist spirit and
to rally the public around Putin.
This rationale, however, seems unlikely.
While domestic concerns surely played a
role in this decision, economic and public
opinion data indicate that the Kremlin was
not in serious risk of losing legitimacy. Be-
fore the annexation, Russian economic in-
dicators were relatively strong and public
approval for Putin was above 60%, in dra-
matic contrast to the single figure approval
ratings for Boris Yeltsin at the end of his
term in 19991. Furthermore, the majority
of the public did not favor intervention in
Ukraine. The key criteria for diversionary
action, widespread domestic unrest, were
not present in Russia before the interven-
tion.
In this paper I explore existing schol-
arly literature to determine the factors that
motivate diversionary war. Using these
insights, I establish specific criterion that
classify conflict as diversionary. Second, I
investigate various key statistics, including
ruble prices, GDP growth, and public ap-
proval polls to determine if Russia’s inter-
vention in Crimea can be characterized as
a diversionary action. I conclude that Rus-
sia did not annex Crimea due to diversion-
ary pressures. Lastly, I argue that the de-
teriorating economic situation in the wake
of the action could force the Kremlin to
remain invested in the Crimea to distract
the population from social hardships. Al-
though it did not start out as one, Russia’s
continued intervention in Eastern Ukraine
may develop into a diversionary conflict.
1Putin’s approval ratings are especially impressive when considering that his predecessor, of
the same political party, left o ce with a less than 5% approval rating.
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Defining Diversionary War
Traditional realist literature has mini-
mized domestic factors in the outbreak of
wars. (Mearshimer, 2001, p. 15) Under this
paradigm, states are seen as actors in an
anarchic international system. Since the
primary goal of states is survival and power
is relative, their actions are predictable.
Jack Levy challenges this hypothesis in
Domestic Politics and War, linking inter-
nal factors to foreign policy. He primar-
ily focuses on the diversionary theory of
war, which argues, “political elites can use
a foreign war to divert popular attention
from internal social, economic, and polit-
ical problems.” (Levy, 1988, p. 666) The
primary motivation for this action is regime
survival in a time of potential domestic cri-
sis. Specifically, elites will try to foster na-
tionalism and create a narrative of the state
under attack in order to direct the anger of
the population away from the failing gov-
ernment. Georges Michon provides an ex-
ample of diversionary war with the French
foreign policy in 1792: “War was willed
solely to act as a diversion from the social
problems. [War] would give the govern-
ment dictatorial powers and would allow
it to eliminate its detested enemies. For
these groups the war was a grand maneuver
of domestic politics.” (Levy, 1988, p. 668)
Similarly, other scholars have linked the
Russo-Japanese War, World War 1, and
the Falklands War to diversionary pres-
sures.
Amy Oakes expands on the diversion-
ary war literature and examines the ra-
tionale behind Argentina’s invasion of the
Falkland Islands. She argues, “the deci-
sion to initiate a diversionary conflict is
typically influenced by three factors: mo-
tivation, domestic constraints, and oppor-
tunity.” (Oakes, 2006, p. 433) Faced with
these internal issues, the state can re-
form, repress, or divert the public’s at-
tention. A regime is driven to diversion-
ary war when faced with “escalating so-
cial unrest, limited extractive capability,
calls for extreme reform, and a low-cost tar-
get.” (Oakes, 2006, p. 433) Oakes supple-
ments Levy’s definition by including causal
linkages and discussing policy alternatives
to diversionary action. In the case of Ar-
gentina, the deteriorating economic situa-
tion in 1981 set o↵ a series of nationwide
strikes and protests against the military
junta. The government’s extractive capac-
ity plummeted and the state was “on the
verge of insolvency,” (Oakes, 2006, p. 454)
constraining the actions of the regime re-
garding potential economic stimulus. This
prevented the opportunity for reform or
repression, simply because they were too
costly. Given the junta’s perception that
Britain would not retaliate, diverting the
public’s attention and rallying the coun-
try behind the government by invading
the Falklands appeared as the most cost-
e↵ective way of quelling the unrest.
In order to di↵erentiate diversionary
war from other types of conflict, certain
criteria must be met. Regimes facing sim-
ilar internal circumstances to those in Ar-
gentina before the Falklands War are much
more likely than others to launch a di-
versionary conflict. Specifically, the ruling
party must feel threatened by rising domes-
tic unrest, constrained by decreasing ex-
tractive capabilities and limited economic
policy options, and presented with a low-
cost target to invade. To quantify these
factors I will use public opinion data to rep-
resent domestic sentiment, tax revenue as
a percent of GDP to illustrate the govern-
ment’s extractive capabilities, and previous
international responses to regional conflicts
to determine if a low cost target exists. If a
state is faced with significant drops in pub-
lic approval ratings and tax revenue and re-
sponds by invading another country with a
low perceived cost, then this action is likely
diversionary.
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Russia and the Crimean Peninsula
Was Russia’s annexation of the Crimean
peninsula in March 2014 a diversionary ac-
tion? Several accounts of this interven-
tion claim that it was, given the slug-
gish economy, low extractive capability and
relatively low public approval for Putin.
Timothy Frye claims, “Russia’s problem
is not that it lacks territory but that it
governs badly the territory it has.” (Frye,
2014) Applying Oates’s framework, this
poor governance hampers the tax collection
e ciency of the state and therefore its ef-
fectiveness in enacting economic reforms or
brutal repression measures. Coupled with
sluggish GDP growth rates this could be a
precondition for diversionary war. (Bank,
2015) Others point to Putin’s skyrocketing
approval rate in the wake of the annexa-
tion as validation of the administration’s
e↵orts to distract the Russian people from
the weakening economy.
Reserves of the Russian Federation. Source: Central
Bank of the Russian Federation
However, a closer look at the economic
data presents a di↵erent picture. World
Bank reports indicate a stable rate of tax
collection as a percentage of GDP for the
last decade. (Bank, 2015) Whereas the Ar-
gentine government had lost capacity in the
months leading up to the Falklands War,
the Kremlin has been able to maintain a
steady rate of tax collection as a percent
of GDP. Furthermore, unlike the military
junta, Moscow had almost $500 billion in
reserves before the crisis, giving the admin-
istration some room for economic stimulus.
Thus, at least one of the criteria for di-
versionary action, lack of economic policy
options, was not present before the annex-
ation. Economic indicators are also mixed.
Although the Ruble lost value in early
2014, stable oil prices (energy sales account
for 50% of Russian federal revenue (Simon,
2015)) at the time gave no cause for se-
rious concern. On the day of the Crimean
annexation oil was trading at $105 a barrel,
which is the price Moscow needs to balance
its budget. (Holodny, 2015) GDP figures il-
lustrate a similar story of an economy slow-
ing down but not in crisis. (Bank, 2015)
Although there were anti-Putin demonstra-
tions before the annexation, they were not
related to the economy, which at the time
seemed to be stable. Clearly the situa-
tion was nothing like the crashing econ-
omy of Argentina in 1981, with its nation-
wide workers strikes and mass protests. At
the time of the Crimean annexation, the
Russian government was not constrained
economically with regards to policy due to
their stable tax collection and sizeable re-
serves. If Moscow had wanted to quell un-
rest, it had cheaper options than diversion-
ary war.
Approval ratings of V. Putin for 24 months before the
Crimean takeover in early 2014. Source: Levada Center
In addition to a relatively stable econ-
omy, there was no indication of rising do-
mestic unrest before the Crimean annexa-
tion. Per the Levada Center, Putin’s gov-
ernment had an approval rating of 69% just
before Victor Yanukovych ceded power,
and it had been as high as 86% at other
times during his presidency. (Center, 2015)
These figures do not describe a government
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in danger of losing the public. A separate
poll conducted by Gallup presents slightly
lower, but nonetheless stable, ratings of
54% in 2012 and 2013. (Ray Esipova, 2014)
Despite the highly publicized protests in
the wake of the 2012 elections, these num-
bers suggest that the Putin was not facing
a legitimacy crisis and that these were iso-
lated incidents rather than a widespread
movement. In fact, both the Levada and
Gallup polls show that Putin’s approval
rating was significantly rising before the
conflict, likely due to the Sochi Olympics.
Moscow was not facing significant domes-
tic unrest prior to the Crimean annexation,
and thus it is unlikely that this action was
diversionary.
In response to this data, some would
argue that the Kremlin took preemptive
action to prevent approval ratings from
falling in the future by annexing the
Crimea. The weak international response
to the Georgian War of 2007 signaled to
the Russian government that the Crimea
would be a low cost target, a prime target
for diversionary action. As with the Geor-
gian intervention, annexation could pro-
vide an e↵ective way to rally the public
around the state and distract from inter-
nal problems. However, as late as February
2014, 75% of Russians opposed military in-
tervention in Ukraine. (Aiken, 2014) (How-
ever, this number decreased dramatically
after the annexation.) Even if the Krem-
lin perceived growing unrest, the above
poll implies that overt military interven-
tion in Ukraine would harm, rather than
bolster Putin’s regime. Additionally, this
argument cannot explain the timing of the
intervention. If Moscow was truly con-
cerned with domestic unrest, then the in-
tervention should have happened in 2012 or
2013, when approval ratings were at their
lowest. As mentioned earlier, Putin’s ap-
proval ratings were rising significantly af-
ter the Olympics and Russians had grow-
ing confidence in their economy. (Ray Es-
ipova, 2014) While high approval ratings
may have been a result of the intervention,
they were not the primary motivation for
the annexation.
Alternative Explanations
Given the economic and public opinion
statistics I have presented, it is highly
unlikely that Russian elites were moti-
vated by diversionary pressures to annex
the Crimean peninsula. Moscow did not
face decreasing extractive capabilities or
widespread social unrest, critical factors for
motivating diversionary action. Alterna-
tively, Moscow was most likely motivated
by strategic concerns and nationalistic am-
bitions after Ukraine’s overtures to the EU
amid waning Russian influence. The pro-
Russian president Viktor Yanukovych, who
had just spurned the EU to sign a loan
agreement with Moscow, had just been
ousted and replaced with a pro-Western
government. Similarly to Georgia before
the Russian invasion in 2008, the Ukrainian
parliament had just signed a trade agree-
ment with the EU and was posturing to
join NATO. (Manko↵, 2014) Ukraine has
long been an important strategic region for
Russia and is part of the “near-abroad,”
the Russian sphere of influence defined by
Putin. (Herpen, 2014, p. 244) Furthermore,
there is a key Russian naval base in Sev-
astopol, Crimea that houses part of the
Black Sea fleet. As such, Moscow was un-
willing to tolerate defection to the EU and
used coercive force to punish the former So-
viet republic.
Nationalist motivations for interven-
tion in Ukraine were also similar to those
that led to Russian intervention in Geor-
gia. Putin considers both states under
the influence of Russia, and he even re-
marked in 2008 that Ukraine, “is not
a real country.” (Herpen, 2014, p. 244)
Medvedev and Putin have frequently de-
scribed Ukraine as the “younger brother”
that “may not be separated” from Rus-
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sia. (Herpen, 2014, p. 244=6) Ukraine is
also critical for Putin’s proposed Eurasian
Union, an alternative to the EU that would
include military integration as well as eco-
nomic cooperation. Putin has based his le-
gitimacy on his ability to restore Russia to
greatness, and part of this vision includes
exerting influence beyond Russia’s borders,
especially with regards to former Soviet re-
publics. If Ukraine, a country traditionally
dependent on Russia, refrains from joining
the Eurasian Union, the image Putin has
created of Russian prestige and power may
fall apart.
Strategic and nationalist motivations
help to explain the timing of the Russian
intervention, a key drawback to the diver-
sionary framework. The regime change in
Ukraine, rather than a desire to distract
an upset public, convinced the Kremlin
to take annex the Crimean peninsula in
March 2014. It was critical that Moscow
took action quickly before the West was
able to support the fledgling regime. Just a
month after Yanukovych was ousted from
power, Russian troops occupied Crimea.
Shift to Diversionary War?
Unfortunately for the Russian economy,
unlike the Georgian War, the West
quickly responded by implementing dam-
aging sanctions. These sanctions, coupled
with plummeting oil prices, have sent the
Russian economy into a deep recession.
GDP fell almost 5% in the last quarter
and real disposable income fell by 3.1%
this year. (Economist, 2015) This has con-
strained the Kremlin, which has chosen not
(or has not been able) to attempt any eco-
nomic reform to alleviate the crisis. Shock-
ingly, approval ratings for Putin are at
89%, an all time high. (Nardelli, 2015) In
striking contrast to the February 2014 fig-
ures, 87% of Russian’s now support the
annexation of Crimea. (Nardelli, 2015) Al-
though diversionary pressures did not orig-
inally motivate the annexation, the regime
has used the intervention and continued
nationalist rhetoric to divert the public’s
attention away from the troubled economy,
turning the conflict in Ukraine into a diver-
sionary one.
Moscow has achieved this by framing
the conflict as the West trying to humil-
iate and cripple Russia via sanctions and
the new government in Ukraine. Putin has
linked falling oil prices, and therefore the
struggling economy, to a Western conspir-
acy and launched a widely successful pro-
paganda campaign to convince the public.
As a result, 66% of Russians polled “believe
Western sanctions are meant to humiliate
and weaken Russia” while only 5% believe
they are meant to help end the Ukrainian
conflict. (Nardelli, 2015) Similarly to other
diversionary wars, Putin has rallied the
public around the government in the face
of a perceived threat to the country. Al-
though the Kremlin and falling oil prices
are responsible for the weak economy, most
Russians instead blame the United States
and the EU.
Implications
The motivations behind the initial annex-
ation and the shift to diversionary action
provide policy insights. Rather than sim-
ply dealing with a besieged regime act-
ing to protect itself from domestic pres-
sure, the West faces an administration keen
on stoking nationalism and Soviet nostal-
gia. (Gross, 2014) It is unlikely that the
Kremlin would leave the Crimea and risk a
weakened image in the eyes of the nation-
alists it has encouraged. Furthermore, the
strategic importance of Ukraine to Russia
cannot be understated. However, the dete-
riorating Russian economy has put politi-
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cal elites in a di cult position. The coun-
try now faces risk of recession, plummet-
ing oil prices, and international isolation.
In response, the government has blamed
the West for Russia’s economy malaise and
turned the conflict into a diversionary one.
Although it is di cult to imagine a com-
plete recovery without the assistance of Eu-
rope and the United States, these devel-
opments may prevent Putin from making
concessions over Crimea. Not only does
Ukraine matter for Russian pride, it allows
Putin to divert the attention of the pub-
lic. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to end
well for the Russian public. If Moscow con-
tinues down this route, Russia will grow
further apart from the West, the economy
will continue to su↵er without much needed
foreign capital, and a long-term solution in
Eastern Ukraine will be less likely.
References
Aiken, Michael. 2014. From Russia With No Love - Diplomatic Courier. Diplomatic
Courier.
Bank, The World. 2015. Data — The World Bank. Tech. rept.
Center, Levada. 2015. Indexes — Levada-Center. Tech. rept. Levada Center.
Economist, The. 2015. The Path to Penury.
Frye, Timothy. 2014. The Downsides of Crimea for Russia. The Washington Post.
Gross, Terry. 2014. How Crimea’s Annexation Plays To Russians’ Soviet Nostalgia.
Herpen, Marcel Van. 2014. Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism. Rowman
& Littlefield.
Holodny, Elena. 2015. Here Are the Break-even Oil Prices for 13 of the World’s Biggest
Producers. Business Insider.
Levy, Jack S. 1988. Domestic Politics and War. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18.
Manko↵, Je↵rey. 2014. Russia’s Latest Land Grab. Foreign A↵airs.
Mearshimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Norton.
Nardelli, Alberto. 2015. Vladimir Putin’s Approval Rating at Record Levels.
Oakes, Amy. 2006. Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands.
Security Studies, 15.
Ray Esipova, Julie Esipova, Neli Esipova. 2014. Russian Approval of Putin Soars to Highest
Level in Years.
Shuster, Simon. 2010. U.S.-Russia Relations: In Need of a New Reset. Time.
Simon, Ellen. 2015. How Long Can Russia Survive With Low Oil Prices? Investopedia.
Today, Russia. 2015. Gorbachev: US Dragging Russia into New Cold War, Which Might
Grow into Armed Conflict.
